ABSTRACT Deregulation of electricity retail market enables competition among retailers and thereby enriches customers' choices. In this environment, retailers compete in the retail market mainly by bidding their retail prices. As bidding price of a retailer increases, customers would reduce their demands on this retailer, or even switch their demands to other retailers with lower bidding prices. These potential consequences will inevitably impact retailers' bidding strategies in the retail market. The impacts of consumers' switching behaviors and contract trading on strategic behaviors of retailers in the retail market is first investigated in this paper. A Bertrand-based game model for the retail market is proposed while considering customers' switching behaviors and retailers' contract trading. Specifically, in the proposed model, the market share function is introduced to describe customers' elasticity and switching behaviors. Also, the close-loop interaction of the wholesale market and retail market is considered. In addition, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the game model are proved. The nonlinear complementarity approach is employed to find the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Effectiveness of the theoretical model is verified by numerical examples. Simulation results show that both customers' switching behaviors and retailers' contract trading can help mitigate market power abuse of retailers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deregulation of the electricity retail market is an important trend in the power industry around the world. A major goal of the deregulation is to increase competition among electricity retailers and thereby enrich customers' choices [1] . As the electricity retail market is becoming more competitive and diverse than the traditional one, various retailers begin to participate in the retail competition by submitting bidding prices. Additionally, the technical innovation [2] of energy management technologies such as the Home Energy Management System (HEMS) [3] and the Building Energy Management System (BEMS) [4] gradually enables the active participation of customers in the retail market. Hence, it can be expected that customers will proactively respond to retail price changes [5] . Two major actions adopted by customers could include adjusting their demands and switching their load service entities. That is, when the retail price offered by a retailer increases, rational customers supplied by this retailer will reduce their demands, and/or switch portion of the decreased demand to other retailers with lower bidding prices. These behaviors will directly affect retailers' bidding strategies in the retail market. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate customers' elasticity and switching behaviors into the analysis of retailers' bidding strategies in the electricity retail market.
Nowadays, in the electricity retail market of a certain region, existing regional incumbents usually own a larger customer base. The market shares of new retailers, i.e., entrants, are often small [6] - [8] , which makes the retail market is more akin to oligopoly than perfect competition. To analyze strategic bidding behaviors of participants in oligopolistic electricity market, oligopoly equilibrium models, especially the Cournot model and supply function equilibrium (SFE) model, can be used. While issues of generators' bidding strategies and market power abuse in the electricity wholesale market have been extensively studied via equilibrium models [9] - [12] , investigation of retailers' bidding strategies and market power abuse in the electricity retail market using such equilibrium models is very limited [13] .
In [14] , the Cournot model is employed to clear hourly electricity market prices in the retail market with multiple suppliers and customers, which indicates that game modeling is necessary for a better understanding of the future electricity retail market. Jalali and Kazemi [15] consider a market with multiple retailers, and their interactions are simulated via the SFE model. Different from these literatures in which retail price is assumed to be uniform for all retailers, He and Reiner [16] point out that retail prices among retailers could be different. This is because although electricity is considered as a homogenous product, retailers, including local incumbents and entrants, could differentiate themselves by different reputation, long-term strategies, and risk attitudes. In this sense, retail prices would shift from a regulated and uniform tariff to discriminatory prices [17] . In [18] , retailers' decision-making problem is formulated as a Nash equilibrium problem considering the strategies of other retailers, in which each retailer tries to determine its retail price and energy procurement strategy. In addition, it is pointed out in [19] that electricity retail competition should be on price in a setting of Bertrand-like oligopolistic competition.
Recently, much work has been done on the modeling of customers' elasticity and switching behaviors. Piecewise linear price-quota curve (PQC) [18] , [20] , [21] is often used to describe the relationship between retailer's market share and retail prices. However, Carrión et al. [22] indicates that PQC may be difficult to derive and does not explicitly model the competition among rival retailers. Therefore, a similar function called market share function (MSF) has been adopted, which can model the elasticity and switching behaviors of customers. Specifically, if retail price is too high, customers would incline to reduce demands on their original retailers and switch to be partly supplied by other retailers. Although MSFs in [23] and [24] have considered customers switching behaviors, these models fail to incorporate the effect of other retailers' bidding prices. In order to derive the MSF that describes the retail load served by a retailer against different retail prices offered by itself and its rivals, [25] assumes that a representative customer exists in the retail market who determines demands for different retailers so as to maximize the payoff. However, the MSF in [25] only considers one rival's bidding price. Up to now, few papers have adopted MSF in the equilibrium analysis of the electricity retail market.
As intermediaries, retailers purchase electric energy from the wholesale market and resell it to customers in the retail market [26] . In the real-time pricing scheme, retail prices offered by retailers are highly linked to the wholesale price.
Considering flexibilities of customers, customers can rationally adjust their demands or switch retailers depending on the variation of the retailers' bidding prices, which leads to the variation of retailers' market shares. This will in turn influence the power demand in the wholesale market and consequently affect the wholesale price [27] . Instead of assuming the wholesale price as an exogenous stochastic variable or even a given value in many literatures, the closedloop interaction among retail prices, retail loads, and the wholesale price should be considered.
In addition to selling electricity through a bidding process, retailers can also sign forward contracts with customers to supply their demands at fixed prices during a specific time period. Usually, a large number of contract trading between retailers and customers is used to hedge against the risk of retailers' profit variability [18] , [28] . Although equilibrium models have already been used to illustrate that forward contracts can help mitigate the market power abuse of large power plants in electricity wholesale market [29] , [30] , impact of retail contract trading on retailers' bidding strategies remains to be studied.
Given the above background, this paper investigates for the first time the impacts of consumers' switching behaviors and contract trading on strategic behaviors of retailers in the retail market. The novelty and contributions are summarized below:
(1) The Bertrand-based game model for retailers' bidding in the electricity retail market is proposed taking customers' switching behaviors and retailers' contracts trading into account. (2) In the proposed model, the MSF is formulated by solving the payoff maximization problem of the representative customer, which can reflect customers' elasticity and switching behaviors to retail prices offered by different retailers. (3) The wholesale price is considered as an endogenous variable in the proposed game model. The closed-loop interaction among retail prices, retail loads, and the wholesale price is accurately considered. (4) The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the proposed model is proved to exist and be unique. The equilibrium outcomes are calculated via a nonlinear complementarity approach. (5) General conclusions and practical insights are derived from numerical analysis. It is clearly shown that the customer switching behavior and contract trading can help mitigate market power abuse of retailers in the oligopolistic retail market. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the framework, the formulation of MSF, and the equilibrium model, followed by the rigorous proof of the existence and uniqueness of the NE. In addition, a nonlinear complementarity method is discussed to calculate the equilibrium outcomes. Numerical results and discussions are provided in Section III. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper. 
II. PROBLEM MODELING A. RETAILERS' TRADING FRAMEWORK
Let the time divided into consecutive fixed-length intervals, and we focus on a single time interval (i.e., 1 hour). Considering that there are N retailers competing in the electricity retail market who can be selected by individual customers for their suppliers. Let I = {1, 2, . . . , N } denotes the set of retailers. As the intermediary, each retailer purchases electricity from the wholesale market and sells it to customers through bidding process and contract trading. The retailers' trading framework is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
As shown in Fig. 2 , the retailers' decision-making process involving wholesale market and retail market is outlined as follows: chases electricity x i from the wholesale market at the wholesale price p w to supply demands of its customers. In this paper, the wholesale market price is considered as a variable, which is related to the total demand of the wholesale market. This can be modeled by a supply curve [28] , which is a monotonically increasing linear function of the total demand given as:
where A and ξ are given positive coefficients.
B. MARKET SHARE FUNCTION
Several factors need to be considered in determining the retailer's market share function, including retail prices of the retailer itself and its rivals as well as customers' switching behaviors.
A linear form of the market share function is employed to describe loads to be served by the retailer against different prices offered by multiple retailers in the retail market. Such a linear form can present a reasonable load-price relationship while providing benefits of analytical tractability [25] . In theory, such linear market share function can be derived by assuming that a fictional representative customer exists in the electricity retail market, who determines retail loads for all retailers so as to maximize the total payoff.
According to [31] , the quadratic and strictly concave utility function of the representative customer is adopted as
where a i , b i , and b i,j are positive coefficients,
. . , x N ) denotes the set of retail loads, i.e., electricity energy sold by individual retailers in retail market. The emergence of smart metering devices in modern power systems enables customers to receive bidding price signals from retailers. Let λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ N ) denotes the set of bidding prices offered by retailers. The representative customer aims to determine the electricity retail loads x for maximizing the total payoff. The decision problem of the representative customer is described as in (3) .
Let the first order derivative of (3) with respect to x i equals to zero, the inverse demand function (4) can be derived, which represents the relationship between the retail price offered by VOLUME 6, 2018 retailer i and the retail loads.
Then, the relationship between retail prices of all retailers and their corresponding retail loads can be represented in the matrix form as follows:
where
Note that b is a symmetric matrix with non-zero diagonal elements, that is, b is invertible. Thus, we have
Let β = b −1 , which is also a symmetric matrix. Furthermore, equation (6) can be presented as
Let λ −i denotes the set of retail prices except retailer i, i.e., λ −i = (λ l ) l∈I\{i} . Then, we have λ i = (λ i , λ −i ). It can be obtained from (7) that, for retailer i, when the strategy of itself is λ i and the strategies of its rival retailers are λ −i , its retail load is
Equation (8) is the market share function of retailer i. Specifically, parameters in the market share function need to satisfy the following characteristics:
(1) β i > 0, indicating that the increase in retailer i's bidding price will lead to the decrease in customer demands, and consequently the retail load of retailer i will also decrease. (2) β i,j ≤ 0 is called the switching factor. β i,j = 0 means that the customer has no switching behavior between retailer i and retailer j. β i,j < 0 means that the customer has switching behaviors between retailer i and retailer j. If the retail price offered by retailer j increases, customer will switch a part of demands from retailer j to retailer i, which will lead to the increase of retail i's retail load. A larger β i,j indicates a higher consumer-switching potential. (8) unchanged, oneunit increase in bidding prices of all retailers will not lead to the increase in customer demand to retailer i. In other words, one-unit reduction in bidding prices of all retailers will not lead to the decrease of customer demand to retailer i. As β is a symmetric matrix, β i > N j=1,j =i β j,i also holds. When β i,j = 0(i, j ∈ I and i = j), the market share function of retailer i can be simplified as:
By choosing different parameter values, namely a i and β i , we can differentiate retailers. For example, for a retailer with relatively higher reputation and larger customer base, the potential market size β i a i is relatively larger; meanwhile, the price sensitivity parameter β i is relatively smaller meaning that the retailer may not lose customers easily by raising its bidding prices.
C. EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
Neglecting costs related to transmission and distribution losses and congestion, the profit of retailer i(i ∈ I) can be written as:
where R i is retailer i's total profit; I r i and I c i are respectively retailer i's revenue from bidding and contract trading in the retail market; C w i is retailer i's purchasing cost from the wholesale market, which can be calculated as:
Each rational retailer maximizes its profit by choosing its own bidding price within a certain range by considering bidding variables of other retailers. Based on the above expressions, the optimization problem of retailer i (i ∈ I) can be defined as the following mathematical program:
where equation (15) (17) guarantees that the signed contract volume of retailer i is not larger than its retail load.
It can be seen that each retailer's profit depends on not only its own bidding price, but also bidding prices of its rivals. Thus, this paper explores the Nash equilibrium model which includes optimization problems (14)- (17) of all individual retailers. We consider that the bidding game of retailers in the electricity retail market is a one-time game, not a repeat game, and retailers will not cooperate.
Definition 1: The noncooperative game studied in this paper is defined as G = {I , (λ i ) i∈I , (R i (λ)) i∈I }.
Definition 2: For the noncooperative game G, the vector of retailers' strategies λ * = (λ * 1 , λ * 2 , . . . , λ * N ) is an NE if and only if
That is, if no retailer has incentives to unilaterally change its bid, the NE will be achieved in the equilibrium model.
D. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF NE
In a general noncooperative game, an NE is not always guaranteed to exist and be unique. Thus, we investigate whether there exists a unique NE in the proposed Bertrand game.
Theorem 1: There exists at least one pure strategy NE in the proposed Bertrand game in the retail market.
Proof: According to [33] , the game exits pure strategy NE if the following two conditions hold:
i) The strategy space of each retailer is closed, bounded, and convex. ii) The profit function of each retailer is continuous and quasiconcave with respect to its own strategy. By definition, for i ∈ I, the strategy space i of retailer i is a closed, bounded and convex set which satisfies Condition i). Then, taking the first and the second derivatives of R i (λ) with respect to λ i , we have
Equation (18) shows that the profit function of retailer i is continuous. As the market share function needs to satisfy certain characteristics, i.e., β i > 0 and β being a diagonallydominant matrix, the right-hand side of (19) is negative. Therefore, the profit function of retailer i is strictly concave on its strategy space i , and thus a quasiconcave function. Consequently, Condition ii) is also met.
In summary, the Bertrand game among retailers in the retail market has at least one NE.
Theorem 2:
The proposed Bertrand game in the retail market has a unique NE.
Proof: According to [33] , the proposed equilibrium model has a unique NE if the best response mapping of each retailer is a contraction on its entire strategy space.
The best response function of retailer i is the best strategy for retailer i, given the other retailers' strategies λ −i . That is,
Taking the derivative of (18) with respect to λ j , we have
By applying the implicit function theorem, the first order derivative of retail i's λ i (λ −i ) with respect to its rival's bidding price λ j (j = i) can be computed as:
If ∂ 2 R i (λ)/∂λ i ∂λ j ≥ 0, from (22) we have
and
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From (25) we know that
When n → ∞, we have −1≤-∂λ i (λ)/∂λ j < 0. In summary, the best response function of retail i satisfies |∂λ i (λ)/∂λ j | < 1, which means the best response function of retailer i is a contract mapping [33] . Thus, Theorem 2 is proved, i.e., there exists a unique NE in our Bertrand equilibrium model.
E. SOLUTION METHOD
The equilibrium of the Bertrand game G can be obtained by gathering optimization problems (14)- (17) of individual retailers and solving them simultaneously. The NE λ * = (λ * 1 , λ * 2 , . . . , λ * N ) must satisfy the first-order conditions which is also named Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the optimization problem of each retailer, i.e., (λ i , ∀i) :
The NE can be derived by combining the KKT conditions of all retailers' optimization models. Note that the KKT conditions include complementarity conditions, i.e., equalities in (28)- (30) , which are difficult to solve via conventional nonlinear optimization algorithms. In this paper, the nonlinear complementarity method is employed to deal with complementarity conditions. By using the nonlinear complementarity function adopted in [34] , expressions (28)- (30) can be reformulated as the following nonlinear equations:
Therefore, the KKT conditions of each retailer's optimization problem are reformulated as a set of nonlinear equations (27) and (31)- (33) . By solving the nonlinear equation sets of all retailers via the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm, the NE can be derived.
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This section presents detailed numerical examples for equilibrium analysis in the electricity retail market.
In a certain region, considering three retailers participate in the competition of the electricity retail market. As mentioned above, when there is no switching behavior, i.e., β i,j = 0, a i and β i can be used to differentiate the three retailers, as shown in TABLE 1. It can be seen that compared with retailer 1 and retailer 2, retailer 3 has a relatively higher reputation and larger customer base. Besides, the parameters in (1) are A = 50$/MWh and ξ = 0.003$/(MW) 2 h.
A. EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES CONSIDERING DIFFERENT RETAILERS
The equilibrium outcomes of the following two cases are shown in TABLE 2.
Case 1: No switching behavior in the retail market, that is, β i,j = 0 (i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j).
Case 2: Considering switching behaviors and assuming that the switching factor β i,j (i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j) in each retailer's market share function equals to −3(MW) 2 h/$.
It can be seen from TABLE 2 that in Case 1, retail prices offered by retailers 1, 2, and 3 are respectively 26.3%, 36.0%, and 45.6% higher than the wholesale price. Besides, their shares of retail loads are 26.9%, 33.2% and 39.9% of the total demand, respectively. In addition, the equilibrium profit of retailer 3 is the largest. These results demonstrate that retailers can exercise market power by raising their retail 75104 VOLUME 6, 2018 prices in the oligopolistic retail market. In particular, retailer 3 with relatively higher reputation and larger customer base can occupy relatively larger market share and gain more profit by offering a relatively higher retail price.
Considering customers' switching behaviors in Case 2 means that the sensitivity of customers to rival retailers' bids is considered. Therefore, retail prices offered by retailers 1, 2, and 3 in Case 2 are lower than those in Case 1, which are only 19.7%, 29.3%, and 39.4% higher than the wholesale price, respectively. The shares of retailer 1, 2 and 3's retail loads in Case 2 are 24.6%, 33.2% and 42.2% of the total demand, respectively. Meanwhile, compared with Case 1, the equilibrium retail loads and equilibrium profits of three retailers in Case 2 are also reduced. These results clearly show that the market power of retailers in electricity retail market could be mitigated by considering customers' switching behaviors.
B. IMPACTS OF SWITCHING BEHAVIORS ON EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
Considering that the three retailers as shown in TABLE 1 only participate in bidding process of the retail market. Supposing that customers have no switching behavior between retailers 1 and 2 as well as between retailers 1 and 3, i.e., β 1,2 = β 2,1 = 0 and β 1,3 = β 3,1 = 0. We focus on analyzing how the variation of switching factors between retailers 2 and 3 will influence the market equilibrium. Figs. 3-5 show the equilibrium outcomes of each retailer at NE, including retail prices, retail loads, and their profits, with respect to switching factors |β 2,3 | and |β 3,2 |.
From Figs. 3-5, we observe that as the increase of |β 2,3 | and |β 3,2 |, the equilibrium retail prices, retail loads, and profits of retailers 2 and 3 will all decrease. The reasons are as follows:
(1) The increase in the switching factor means the increase in customer's flexibility, which can help mitigate the market power exercised by retailers 2 and 3, thereby incentivizing them to lower their bidding prices, as shown in Fig. 3 . Thus, the equilibrium profits of retailers 2 and 3 will decrease, as shown in Fig. 5 . (2) As the market power of retailers 2 and 3 is gradually restrained, the difference between their bidding prices and the wholesale price will reduce, as shown in Fig. 6 . This means less profit for retailers to sell per unit electricity, which will lead to the reduction of retailers 2 and 3's willingness to supply electricity in the retail market. Therefore, the retailer loads of retailers 2 and 3 will decrease, as shown in Fig. 4 . Besides, as no switching behaviors are considered between retailer 1 and other retailers, i.e. β 1,2 = β 2,1 = 0 and β 1,3 = β 3,1 = 0, the variation of |β 2,3 | and |β 3,2 | has negligible impacts on retailer 1's bidding strategies. Indeed, with the increase in the switching factor, retailer 1's bidding price is slightly decreased because of the decrease of its rival retailers' bidding prices. On the one hand, due to the increase in the difference between retailer 1's bidding price and the VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 6. Impacts of switching behaviors on the difference between retail prices and wholesale price. wholesale price, retailer 1's willingness to supply electricity in the retail market will increase. On the other hand, due to the decrease in retailer 2 and retailer 3's retail loads, a part of their customer demands will switch to retailer 1. Consequently, both equilibrium retail load and equilibrium profit of retailer 1 will increase with the increase in switching factors |β 2,3 | and |β 3,2 |.
In addition, with the increase in switching factors |β 2,3 | and |β 3,2 |, the magnitude of decrease in retailers 2 and 3's retail loads is larger than the magnitude of increase in retailer 1's retail load, which will lead to the decline of the total demand in the retail market and thereby the wholesale price, as shown in Fig. 7 .
C. IMPACTS OF CONTRACT TRADING ON EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
Considering that the three retailers in TABLE 1 not only participate in bidding process, but also offer contract trading. Let switching factor β i,j (i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i = j) in each retailer's market share function equal to −3(MW) 2 h/$, and only retailer 3 has contract trading with customers at the price of p c 3 = 60$/MWh. Impacts of retailer 3's contract volume on equilibrium outcomes in the retail market are illustrated in Figs. 8-10 .
It can be seen from Figs. 8 and 9 that with the increase in retailer 3's contract volume, the retail price offered by retailer 3 will decrease and the retail load of retailer 3 will increase. Additionally, Fig. 10 shows that the equilibrium profit of retailer 3 will decrease. These results demonstrate that contract trading can help mitigate retailer 3's market power in the retail market. Moreover, it can also be found that as the increase in retailer 3's contract volume, the retail prices, retail loads, and profits of retailers 1 and 2 are all slightly decreased.
Figs. 11-13 further compare the equilibrium outcomes of retailer 1 and retailer 2 in Figs. 8-10 with those without considering customers' switching behaviors in the retail market. It can be seen that without switching behaviors, retailer 1 and retailer 2's retail prices are slightly increased with the increase in retailer 3's contract volume, which is contrary to Fig. 8 . This is because in the retail market with switching behaviors, contract trading enables retailer 3 to decrease its retail price, and in turn increasing bidding prices of retailer 1 and retailer 2 will lead customers continuously decrease their demands on them and even switch to retailer 3. This will make retailer 1 and retailer 2 lose more market shares and profits. Hence, retailer 1 and retailer 2 will not raise their retail prices in the retail market when switching behaviors exist.
In addition, in the retail market without switching behaviors, the retail loads and profits of retailer 1 and retailer 2 will decrease with the increase in retailer 3's contract volume. Meanwhile, the total demand and wholesale price will increase. These conclusions are theoretically proved in Appendix.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the deregulated retail market, customers' switching behaviors will have crucial impact on the strategic behaviors of retailers. In this paper, a Bertrand game model taking into account customers' switching behaviors and retail contracts in the electricity retail market is proposed. The Nash equilibrium of the model is proved to exist and be unique. Then, the nonlinear complementarity method is employed to derive the Nash equilibrium. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate effectiveness of the proposed model. The results demonstrate that a higher potential of customers to switch among retailers would incentivize retailers to lower their bidding prices, which will reduce retailers' profits. Besides, with the increase in contract volumes between the retailer and customers, the bidding price and profit of the retailer will decrease. Therefore, it can be concluded that there are at least two ways to mitigate potential market power abuse issues of retailers in oligopolistic retail market: one is to stimulate customers' switching behaviors in the retail market, and the other is to encourage retail contract trading between retailers and customers. We have also found that due to the gradual mitigation of retailers' market power, the difference between retail prices and wholesale price will decrease. Thus, in the long term, the way to earn profits from the difference between retail price and wholesale price cannot fully support the effective operation of retailers. Therefore, in order to attract customers and seek further development, retailers need to explore and offer innovative services in the electricity retail market.
The proposed work can be used to analyze and forecast the equilibrium outcomes and market power of retailers in the electricity retail market, which is helpful to improve the efficiency of the electricity retail market.
APPENDIX
This appendix serves to discuss the closed-form expressions of the unique Nash equilibrium in the retail market without customers' switching behaviors, and to analyze how the retail contract volume affects the equilibrium outcomes.
Ignoring inequality constraints, based on (14) and (15), the profit function of retailer i (i ∈ I) can be rewritten as 
Substituting (A4) into (4), the wholesale price can be expressed as:
From (A5) and (A6), the first-order partial derivative of the wholesale price with respect to c i can be derived as follows:
As ξ and β i are positive coefficients, B > 0. Thus, ∂p w /∂c i > 0. That is, with the increase in retailer i's contract volume, the wholesale price will increase.
From (A3) and (A4), we have ∂λ i ∂c i = − 2 + B(2 + β i ξ ) b i (1 + B)(2 + β i ξ ) 2 (A8)
From (A8) and (A9), we know that ∂λ i /∂c i <0 and ∂x i /∂c i > 0. When the contract volume of retailer i increases, its retail price will decrease and its retail load will increase.
The following expressions describe the impacts of retailer i's contract volume on its rival retailers' equilibrium outcomes.
∂λ j ∂c i = ξ (1 + B)(2 + β i ξ )(2 + β j ξ ) (A10)
∂R j ∂c i = − 2ξ (1 + β j ξ )x j (1 + B)(2 + β i ξ )(2 + β j ξ )
It can be seen from (A10)-(A12) that ∂λ j /∂c i > 0, ∂x j /∂c i < 0, and ∂R j /∂c i ≤0. That is, when the contract volume of retailer i increases, retail prices of its rivals will increase, while retail loads and profits of its rivals will decrease.
In addition, taking the first-order partial derivative of all the other retailers' total retail loads with respect to c i , we have 
We obtain N j=1,j =i
It can be known from (A13)-(A15) that when the contract volume of retailer i increases, the magnitude of increase in its own retail load is greater than the magnitude of decrease in its rivals' total retail load. This will lead to the increase in total demands in the electricity retail market.
